Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

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Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

ggm@apnic.net http://www.apnic.net

Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

robertl@apnic.net http://www.apnic.net

Routing Area SIDR This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the issued certificate.

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile , and also conform to the constraints specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted the subject a "right-of-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the association of the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private key of the certificate's issuer. In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number resources within this context, it is intended that Resource Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a certification authority operating at the apex of a resource distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certification authority to the certificate , with the additional constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject certificate chain. Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-of-use of an IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests, and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses. This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.

It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" , "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" , "Internet Protocol" , "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture" , "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" , and related regional Internet registry address management policy documents. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

The framework for describing an association between the subject of a certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control is described in . There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in this profile: RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate profile further specifies that the use of this certificate extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be marked as CRITICAL. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in the resource extension field. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate validity includes the condition that the resources described in the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certification authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in the resource extension.

A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, consistent with the PKIX profile , containing the fields listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource Certificates.

Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this field is 2).

The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per Issuer.

This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } .

This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the immediate superior certificate. This field MUST be non-empty.

This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using a subject name that is unique per issuer. This field MUST be non-empty.

The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of , Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in . In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time other than the current time.

The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of , CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in . In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time other than the current time. CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate.

This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 2048 bits. It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

As noted in Section 4.2 of , each extension in a certificate is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate-using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognised . The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.

The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification paths that include this certificate. The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is permitted be a CA). The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST NOT be present. The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.

The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the subject of this certificate). The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as described in Section 4.2.1.2 of .

The authority key identifier extension provides a means of identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This extension is non-critical. The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as described in Section 4.2.1.1 of .

This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical extension, and it MUST be present. In certificates issued to Certificate Authorities only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") that references a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field MUST be omitted. The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one exception, namely where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.

This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a single reference object to publication location of the immediate superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" certificate, in which case the AIA field SHOULD be omitted. This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST reference the point of publication of the certificate where this issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension. When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same publication name as previously issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certification Practice Statement. This extension is non-critical.

This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information and service collection will include all current valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the subject's corresponding private key. This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred. This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-critical. For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it either references the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the single object that has been signed by the corresponding key pair. When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObjectRepository OID.

When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID.

This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests to list all signed objects that are deposited in the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE. The publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified. Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI access mechanisms for the same manifest object.

CA certificates MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the subject's published manifest object as an object URL. When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE certificate. When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object, the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE certificate. In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.

This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource Certificates. PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. This extension MUST be present and it is critical.

This field contains the list of IP address resources as per . The value may specify the "inherit" element for a particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both extensions. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

This field contains the list of AS number resources as per , or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both extensions. This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), consistent with . The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect CRLs are supported in this profile. An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's validity period. This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that have been revoked by the CA. The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the key pair used by the CA. No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.

Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the integer value of this field is 1).

The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.

This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-512. This field MUST be present. It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate list MUST be absent. For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate.

The time the certificate was revoked. This time MUST NOT be a future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be present in a CRL.

The authority key identifier extension provides a means of identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 4.2.1.1 of . This extension is non-critical.

The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA with the same scope. This extension is non-critical.

A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject, support CRMF.

This profile refines the specification in , as it relates to Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate. This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding certificate.

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. This field is optional. If present, the value of this field SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest attribute as defined in . This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in . This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } . It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size.

This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) specification in , as it relates to Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate. This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding certificate.

This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. As per , this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. As per , this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with dates as determined by the CA. This field is optional. If present, the value of this field SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. This field MUST be present. This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in .

The following control fields are supported in this profile: It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in is that the Authenticator Control field be used.

The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on these extensions.: If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the issued certificate. The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this profile. The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue resource certificates within this overall framework. The CA MUST honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request. This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension appears. Where the subject is a CA in this profile, this information and service collection will include all current valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the subject's corresponding private key. This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An RSYNC URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred by the Subject. A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request the id-ad-caRepository access method, and also MUST include in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the subject's published manifest object as an object URL. This field MAY be present when the subject is a EE. If it is present the field value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request. If it is not present the CA SHOULD honor this request and omit the SIA from the issued certificate. If the CA is not able to honor the request to omit the SIA, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request. When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple objects, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObjectRepository, and also MUST include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE certificate. When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published object, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE certificate, and MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest access method OID in the SIA of the request. In the case when the EE certificate is to be used exclusively to sign one or more unpublished objects, such that the all signed objects will not be published in any RPKI repository, then the SIA SHOULD be omitted from the request. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this profile. With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any requested field.

This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of : To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n certificates) satisfies the following conditions: for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the issuer of certificate x+1; certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.

The IP resource extension definition defines a critical extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource sets: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is larger than range A. Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. The definition of "inheritance" in is equivalent to this "equality" comparison. Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the set X. Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1' is issued by a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources described in certificate 1.

Validation of signed resource data using a target resource certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 'Certification Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions hold: The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and the signature algorithm The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and To values. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and contains field values as specified in this profile for all field values that MUST be present. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is present in the certificate. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself valid. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by a trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certification Path. A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any chosen order. Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource distribution hierarchy, via reference to issued certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the certificate's AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process for each certificate's immediate superior CA certificate. There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certification path validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if the certification path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration parameter.

The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top-down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in question (i.e. no loops in the model). The more general consideration is that selection of one or more trust anchor CAs is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation property, as described in , and the validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource set, as described in . The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust anchor, includes the following: the trusted issuer name, the trusted public key algorithm, the trusted public key, optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the public key, and a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 resources and AS number resources. The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate.

In the RPKI the hierarchical certificate framework corresponds to the hierarchies of the resource distribution function. In consideration of this, it is reasonable to nominate to relying parties a default set of trust anchors for the RPKI that correspond to the entities who operate at the upper levels of the associated resource allocation hierarchy. The corresponding nominated trust anchor CA(s) should therefore map, in some fashion, to apex point(s) of the hierarchical resource distribution structure. The characteristics of a trust anchor framework for the RPKI includes the following considerations: The entity or entities that issue proposed trust anchor material for the RPKI should be as close as possible to the apex of the associated resource distribution hierarchy. Such trust anchor material should be long-lived. As it can be reasonably anticipated that default nominated trust anchor material would be distributed with relying party validation software, the implication is that the distributed default nominated trust anchor material should remain constant for extended time intervals. It is a poor trust model when any entity that issues putative trust anchor material is forced to be authoritative over information or actions of which the entity has no direct knowledge, nor is in possession of a current definitive record of such actions. Entities who propose themselves in a role of a trust anchor issuer should be able to point to corroborative material supporting the assertion that they are legitimate authorities for the information where they are representing themselves as a potential trust anchor for relying parties. An entity offering itself as a putative RPKI trust anchor for a part of the RPKI is required to regularly publish a RPKI CA certificate at a stable URL, and to publish a packaged form of this URL as distributed trust anchor material, as follows: The entity issues a RPKI self-signed "root" CA certificate that is used as the apex of a RPKI certificate issuance hierarchy. This certificate MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key usage extension, and the CA flag set in the basic constraints extension, no AIA value and no CRLDP value. This certificate MUST be reissued at regular intervals prior to expiration of the current RPKI self-signed certificate, and MUST be reissued upon any change in the resource set that has been allocated to the entity who is operating this CA. The validity interval of this certificate should reflect the anticipated period of the regular RPKI certificate re-issuance. The entity maintains a "trust anchor material" key pair. The entity issues a PKI self-signed CA certificate using the trust anchor material key pair, where the subject public key in the certificate is the public key of the trust anchor material key pair and the certificate is signed by the corresponding private key of trust anchor material key pair. This certificate MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the key usage extension, and the CA flag set in the basic constraints extension, no AIA value and no CRLDP value. The validity period of this certificate shold be very long-lived, with the period to be defined by the entity. The SIA of this certificate references a publication point where the CRL and the subordinate product of this certificate are published. The PKI CA issues a subordinate PKI EE certificate with a validity period identical to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed "root" CA certificate. This PKI EE certificate MUST have the digitalSignature bit set, and this MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. The CA flag set MUST be cleared in the basic constraints extension. The validity period of this certificate should be aligned to the validity period of the RPKI self-signed "root" CA certificate. The PKI CA regularly issues a CRL. The CRL issuance cycle SHOULD be shorter than the validity period for the RPKI self-signed "root" certificate. Each time the RPKI self-signed "root" certificate is re-issued, or prior to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, the PKI CA generates a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signed-data object, where the payload is the RPKI self-signed "root" certificate. The object is CMS-signed with the private key of the PKI EE certificate. The PKI EE certificate is included as a CMS signed attribute in the CMS object. The PKI self-signed CA certificate and the asociated CRL are not to be included in the CMS object. The format of the CMS object is specified in . The CMS object is published at the location referenced in the SIA of the PKI self-signed CA certificate. The entity publically distributes the PKI self-signed CA certificate as its proposed trust anchor material. The entity publishes the modulus and exponent of the "trust anchor material" public key using a trusted form of publication that allows the entity's identity to be validated and the retrieval of the published information to be secured. Relying Parties can assemble the default trust anchor collection by using the distributed PKI self-signed CA certificate for each nominated trust anchor: The public key in the self-signed CA PKI certificate can be validated using the modulus and exponent values as retrieved from the entity's publication point using a secured retrieval operation. The PKI CA's CRL and CMS objects can be retrieved from the publication point referenced by the SIA in the PKI CA certificate. The CRL can be verified against the PKI CA certificate. The CMS signature can be verified using the included PKI EE certificate together with the retrieved CRL and the self-signed PKI CA certificate. The relying party can then load the enclosed RPKI self-signed CA certificate as a trust anchor for RPKI validation for those resources described in the resource extension of this RPKI certificate. Relying Parties should perform this retrieval and validation operation at intervals no less frequent than the nextUpdate time of the published CRL, and should perform the retrieval operation prior to the expiration of the PKI EE certificate, or upon revocation of the PKI EE certificate that was used to sign the CMS object that held the relying party's current RPKI self-signed CA certificate. If a trust anchor CA wishes to perform an issuance of the RPKI self-signed CA certificate outside the established update cycle time, it can notify relying parties of this by revising the nextUpdate time of the PKI CA's CRL to a shorter interval, issuing a new PKI CA certificate and a new CMS object with the new RPKI self-signed CA certificate, and revoking the old PKI EE certificate at the nextUpdate time in the next issued CRL. This revocation will provide an indication to relying parties to perform the retrieval operation ofthe RPKI self-signed CA certificate at a time earlier than the normal update cycle time.

The Security Considerations of and apply to Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the status of resource allocations and assignments then the information conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the allocation and assignment databases.

[Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA considerations stated in this document.]

The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of this document. The document also reflects review comments received from Sean Turner and David Cooper.

The following review comments are unresolved at present: Use of additional non-critical extensions: Section 3: "Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate." The review comment was that certificate profile should permit the use of non-critical extensions. The scenario nominatedwas one in which a CA product added non-critical extensions to a certificate that would not affect a relying party's decision to accept the certificate, regardless of whether the relying party could process the extension. It was noted that it may be possible to configure these CA products so that they do not include these extensions in the certificates, but that is a question that would need to be answered by someone more familiar with particular CA products that add non-critical extensions that identify the CA product used to mint the certificate. The rationale for not permitting non-critical extensions is that it was not seen as being appropriate to be in the position of having certificates with extensions which relying parties may see as valid, but contain extensions that, were the relying party to understand the extension, would contradict or qualify in some way this original validity. The profile takes the position of minimialism over extensibility, taking the approach of nomination of a specific goal for the PKI, namely to construct a PKI that precisely matches the IP number resource allocation structure, and then defining a certificate profile that was precisely aligned to this objective. If there is some need or requirement to use the RFC3779 extensions in contexts other than assertions about right of use of resources by virtue of an allocation action, that make use of other extensions than are specified here, then the authors suggest that it would be more appropriate to define a distinct profile to fulfil this function. It is proposed to leave the text as is. CRL Scope: Section 3.9.5: In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all certificates issued by this CA issue using a given key pair. The review comment was that the scope of a CRL must be all certificates issued by the issuing CA unless the CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension. So, if the scope of CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a given key pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from performing key rollover. The latter option may be implemented by having issuers change names whenever changing the key pair used to sign certificates. It is proposed to drop the scope restriction, and remove the text in Section 3.9.5. Name Uniqueness:Section 3.5 stipulates that subject names must simply be unique per issuer, while X.509 requires that names must be globally unique. The review comment was that the Security Considerations section in RFC5280 states: " While X.509 mandates that names be unambiguous, there is a risk that two unrelated authorities will issue certificates and/or CRLs under the same issuer name." X.501 states that a (directory) name shall be unambiguous, in that it denotes just one object, but need not be unique, in that it not be the only name that unambiguously denotes the object, and that for every name form used in the GeneralName type, there shall be a name registration system that ensures that any name used unambiguously identifies one entity to both certificate issuer and certificate users. The review comment is that problem with a less stringent requirement is that if two CAs issue certificates and CRLs under the same name, there is a risk that a relying party will use a CRL issued by one of these CAs to determine the status of a certificate issued by the other CA. The rationale for using a name this is unique per issuer is that the RPKI is strictly hierarchical, the repository publication structure is structured on a per-CA basis, the CRLDP is mandatory to include in all RPKI certificates (except apex self-signed certs) so that each certificate points directly to the associated CRL that can revoke it, the contextof the use of names is within a per issuer context, a single entity may hold resources from multiple sources and the RPKI name space is unconstrained such that it is neither coordinated nor restricted to be structured in any fashion, and the RPKI is not attesting a name or an identity but a right to use resources. Because the context of the use of names in the RPKI is one that positions names within a strict hierarchy, then the essential name attribute of unambiguity is achieved in the RPKI when names are specified to be unique per issuer. It is proposed not to alter the existing specification of uniqueness of names on a per-issuer basis.

ISC APNIC BBN BBN SAMBA

The following is an example Resource Certificate.

The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.

Using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) , a RPKI Trust Anchor Object (RTA) is a type of signed-data object. The general format of a CMS object is:

As a RTA is a signed-data object, it uses the corresponding OID, 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2. .

According to the CMS specification, the signed-data content type shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:

The elements of the signed-data content type are as follows: The version is the syntax version number. It MUST be 3, corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3. The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. . It MUST NOT contain any other algorithms. This element is defined in . The certificates element MUST be included and MUST contain only the single PKI EE certificate needed to validate this CMS Object. The CertificateSet type is defined in section 10 of The crls element MUST be omitted. This element is defined in .

encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself.

The elements of this signed content type are as follows: The ContentType for an RTA is defined as id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor and has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.33.

The content of an RTA is an RPKI self-signed CA certificate. It is formally defined as:

The definition of Certificate is taken from .

SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:

The content of the SignerInfo element are as follows: The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid. The sid is defined as:

For a RTA, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier. The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1. The signedAttrs element is defined as:

The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the content-type and message-digest attributes. The signer MAY also include the signing-time signed attribute, the binary-signing-time signed attribute, or both signed attributes. Other signed attributes that are deemed appropriate MAY also be included. The intent is to allow additional signed attributes to be included if a future need is identified. This does not cause an interoperability concern because unrecognized signed attributes are ignored by the relying party. The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any particular attribute. Additionally, even though the syntax allows for a SET OF AttributeValue, in a RTA the attrValues must consist of only a single AttributeValue. The ContentType attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID for the ContentType attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3. The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in a RTA MUST be 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 (matching the eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo). The MessageDigest attribute MUST be present. The attrType OID for the MessageDigest Attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4. The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute contains the output of the digest algorithm applied to the content being signed, as specified in Section 11.1 of . The SigningTime attribute MAY be present. If it is present it MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of absence of the SigningTime attribute in no way affects the validation of the RTA. The attrType OID for the SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5. The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:

The Time element specifies the time, based on the local system clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the content. The The BinarySigningTime attribute MAY be present. If it is present it MUST be ignored by the relying party. The presence of absence of the BinarySigningTime attribute in no way affects the validation of the RTA. The attrType OID for the SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46. The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:

The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based on the local system clock, at which the digital signature was applied to the content. The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID for which is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.q The signature value is defined as:

The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and signature algorithms. unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.

Before a relying party can use an RTA, the relying party must first validate the RTA by performing the following steps. Verify that the RTA syntax complies with this specification. In particular, verify the following: The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2). The version of the SignedData object is 3. The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1). The certificates field in the SignedData object is present and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object. The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted. The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD]) The version of the SignerInfo is 3. The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1). The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1). The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and contains both the ContentType attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted. Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature on the RTA. Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate in the Trust Anchor PKI by validating that the PKI CA certificate issued this EE certificate, and the PKI CA's CRL has not revoked the EE certificate, and that the PKI CA's CRL is valid.